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SUBSTANCE, PROCESS, AND OUTCOME IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY*
David Lyonst
Scholarship in philosophy proceeds at a slower pace than in the
law. As Tom Lehrer, the poet laureate of a recent generation, might
have said, the law biz travels on a faster track. Or so it seems to a
philosopher who has recently been treading the tracks of constitutional lawyers.
And so it is with apprehension that I take as my text a book that
was published as long ago as 1980. As the title of this lecture might
suggest to someone with so long a memory, the book is John Hart
Ely's Democracy and Distrust.' That work provoked an impressive secondary literature. 2 But as the pace of commentary has slowed con* The John Dewey Lecture in Jurisprudence, presented on October 14, 1986, at
the New York University School of Law. I am grateful to the School of Law for its warm
hospitality and to members of the NYU faculty for their comments, especially on the last
part of the lecture. My further reflections on those issues will require systematic
treatment on another occasion; the present text is substantially that of the lecture as
presented, with citations and supplementary notes added.
t
Professor of Philosophy and of Law, Cornell University. Research that was drawn
upon for this lecture was supported in part by a Constitutional Fellowship from the
National Endowment for the Humanities in 1984-85. I am grateful to Matthew
Nothnagle for his recent research assistance, especially on the position of women in the
"political market," which receives brief treatment in Section IV. The issues and materials that he uncovered cannot be done justice within the present limits of time and space.
I J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
2
See, e.g., Symposium:JudicialReview versus Democracy, 42 OHIo ST. LJ. 3 (1981); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A Response andAlternative to Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the Revised Texas Version of Constitutional
Law, 59 TEx. L. REV. 787 (1981); Caine,JudicialReview-Democracy Versus Constitutionality,
56 TEMPLE L.Q. 297 (1983); Caplan, The Paradoxes of Judicial Review in a Constitutional
Democracy, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 451 (1981); Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong
Question: An Essay on ConstitutionalScholarship andJudicial Review, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1207
(1984); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Estreicher, Platonic
Guardians of Democracy:John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open
Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1981); Gangi, The Supreme Court:An Intentionalist'sCritique
Of NoninterpretiveReview, 28 CATm. LAw. 253 (1983); Laycock, Taking ConstitutionsSeriously:
A Theory ofJudicial Review, 59 TEx. L. REV. 343 (1981); Levinson, JudicialReview and the
Problem of the Comprehensible Constitution, 59 TEx. L. REV. 395 (1981); Michelman, Process
and Property in ConstitutionalTheory, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 577 (1982); Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-BasedResponses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417 (1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE LJ. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on
the Edge of Town: The ContributionsofJohn Hart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE LJ. 1037
(1980); Lynch, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1980); O'Fallon, Book Review, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 1070 (1980). Earlier articles also treated the subject. See, e.g., Bork, The

745

746

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:745

siderably, we who travel in the slower track have had an opportunity
to catch up.
I choose Ely's book as my text because I appreciate its merits
and regret that it did not rise more above the common run of contemporary constitutional theory. I believe, however, that reflecting
on its limits can help us to sharpen our thinking about judicial
review.
Fifteen years ago Judge (then Professor) Bork wrdte, "A persistently disturbing aspect of constitutional law is its lack of theory... ." -3 I have a slightly different concern, namely, the impaired
development of the theory as it currently exists. I hope it is not
ungenerous to mention that I include Bork's own ventures into con4
stitutional theory within the compass of my concern.
I shall first recount Ely's principal ideas and relate them to the
theoretical framework into which they were introduced. I shall then
suggest some theoretical issues that Ely's ideas raise. I do not offer
conclusions but items to be placed upon the agenda of constitutional theory. It may seem as if the literature has already answered
some of the questions I shall discuss. My point is that answers are
not enough; we suffer from a shortage of well-developed reasons to
believe them.
I
CONTEMPORARY CONSTrrUTIONAL THEORY

Ely's premise is that the U.S. Constitution prescribes a system
of "representative democracy." 5 In the context of American consti-

tutional theory, this premise is, at best, conventional wisdom. That
Ely tries to advance beyond banalities is one virtue of his work.
The next step in his argument has proved more controversial.
He maintains that the Constitution is overwhelmingly concerned
with the political "processes" of representative democracy, rather
than with "substantive" values. 6 The problem for judicial review is
to understand the nature of those processes and the limits that the
Constitution places upon them. Ely's approach is to interpret unclear aspects of the Constitution by reference to a theory about the
overall character of the processes that the Constitution prescribes.
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695;
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659.
3
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 1 (1971).
4 I discuss Bork's general theory in Lyons, ConstitutionalInterpretation and Original
Meaning, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 75 (1986), and his application of the general theory to
free speech at infra note 29.
5 J. ELY, supra note 1, at 88.
6 Id. at 73-104. But see infra section III.
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Against the background of recent rhetoric in constitutional theory, such an approach might appear more novel than it really is.
Constitutional theory has suffered from an ill-conceived opposition
between the platitude that courts should decide constitutional cases
solely by "interpretation" of the Constitution and the contention
that courts may sometimes decide these cases on different grounds
entirely. The so-called "interpretivists" profess fidelity to the "original" Constitution, while the so-called "noninterpretivists" worry
about the lines of precedent that would be sacrificed if courts
7
adopted such an approach.
This opposition makes it appear as if one side neither has nor
needs a theory of the Constitution, or even a theory about how to
read it, while the other has a theory, but not one of the Constitution.
Rather, the noninterpretivists seem to call on courts, at least occasionally, to bypass the Constitution entirely.
The conflict is ill-conceived on several grounds; the following
points will serve our present purposes. 8 The apparent contrast between interpretivism and noninterpretivism assumes agreement on
what counts as interpretation of the Constitution as well as agreement on what emerges from the interpretative process. It assumes
that genuine interpretation may not look beyond the "four comers"
of the constitutional document and that the doctrinal products of
the interpretative process are rather thin. None of these assumptions can be sustained.
When carefully qualified, for example, the two approaches quietly converge. 9 Interpretivists and noninterpretivists usually qualify
their definitions so that interpretation includes reference to such
things as "structures and relationships" 10 that are implicit in the institutions prescribed by the Constitution. Both sides usually agree,
in effect, that interpretation can be based on principles that are nowhere specified in the document but only presupposed by constitutional prescriptions. Although the two camps disagree about
constitutional doctrines and how to find them, their qualified views
of constitutional interpretation share some common ground.
7

For the distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism, see Grey, Do

We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). For the parallel distinc-

tion between "originalism" and "nonoriginalism," see Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980).
8 For problems accruing to the distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism, see Dworkin, supra note 2, and Lyons, supra note 4.

9 On the interpretivist side, see, e.g., Bork, supra note 3, at 17; on the noninterpretivist side, see, e.g., Grey, supra note 7, at 706, n.9.
10 It has become a ritual to cite C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), even though Black's strategy of interpretation is rarely used or
discussed. An exception is found in Bork, supra note 3, at 17-35 (discussed at infra note
29).
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Despite the disagreement and the uncertainty surrounding this
area of convergence, the development should be welcome: it seems
to express the realization that one can attribute doctrines to the
Constitution not only because they leap off the document's surface
but also because they derive from an understanding of the institutions it prescribes. In this respect, Ely's idea of working with a theory
about the Constitution's overall character is not really novel at all.
Consider the following familiar example. Scholars routinely attribute to the Constitution a commitment to "majoritarianism" or
"democracy." Some argue as a consequence that judicial review is a
"deviant institution" in our system."' This clearly indicates a theory
at work, for the so-called "counter-majoritarian difficulty"' 2 assumes that majority rule (or something like it) is the overwhelming
principle of the Constitution, even though the Constitution has
never prescribed simple majoritarian democracy or even unrestricted representative government. Finding so strong a commitment to majoritarianism in the Constitution involves reading a good
deal between (or beyond) the lines. It is to see the Constitution
through the prism of a constitutional theory. To agonize then over
the practice of judicial review is to take the theory' 3 very seriously.
II
SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF "REPRESENTATIVE

DEMOCRACY"

Ely deals with the opposing schools of thought about judicial
review by accepting their self-caricatures. He disparages the crude
interpretivist idea that the courts should read and apply the Constitution one piece at a time, as well as the crude noninterpretivist notion that courts should decide constitutional cases by applying
values that have no grounding in the Constitution. He also finds it
easy to escape between the horns of that artificial dilemma. 14 He
11

12

A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962).

Id. at 16.
I use the label "theory" without meaning to disparage. Theories are my stock in
trade, and I have no argument with theory-mongers. But the particular theory that I
have just mentioned is usually framed in simple-minded terms. Ely's theorizing appears,
by comparison, to be sharp and well-developed, which is one reason why it merits our
attention.
14 This is possible because the alternatives that are surveyed and criticized by Ely in
chapters 2 ("clause-bound interpretivism") and 3 (the appeal to "fundamental values")
do not exhaust the possible approaches to judicial review. By contrast, his formulation
of the distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism in chapter I might be
understood to exhaust the possibilities:
Today we are likely to call the contending sides "interpetivism" and
"noninterpretivism'-the former indicating that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are
stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution, the latter the con13
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proposes to interpret the Constitution by developing a theory about
what it overwhelmingly prescribes. This theory generates his solution to the problem of judicial review.
Ely believes that courts should respect the Constitution's emphasis on "process" instead of "substance." He intends, as he says,
"to fill in the Constitution's open texture." 15 He asserts that the
Constitution-including those provisions that are often regarded as
limits on majoritarianism-must be understood as dedicated to a
system of representative democracy. When properly used, these
provisions do not hinder, but help to make it work. He describes
the result as "a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing
16
approach to judicial review."
According to Ely, the Constitution prescribes participationin two
ways. The basic political processes are supposed to be participatory,1 7 and access to those processes, at least to some significant degree, guaranteed. That is the principal point behind
constitutional protections for, say, speech and voting: they "must
. . . be protected, strenuously so, because they are critical to the
18
functioning of an open and effective democratic process."
The Constitution's emphasis on "process" instead of "substance" has a negative aspect too: it prescribes "legitimate
processes, not legitimate outcomes." 19 Ely says:
The constitutionality of most distributions .

.

. cannot be deter-

mined simply by looking to see who ended up with what, but
rather can be approached intelligibly only by attending to the process that brought about the distribution in question-by what
Robert Nozick has called a "historical" (as opposed to an "endresult") approach. 20
trary view that courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce
norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the
document.
J. ELY, supra note 1, at 1. For norms that are not discoverable "within the four corners of
the document," that is, which are not "stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution," might still be attributableto the Constitution. To complicate matters, Ely's formulation of the distinction would classify the mode ofjudicial review that he recommends
as noninterpretivist, but because he bases his theory on an interpretation of the Constitution as a whole, he suggests that it "represents the ultimate interpretivism." Id. at 8788. Unfortunately, this careless use of theoretical categories seems characteristic of contemporary constitutional theory.
15 J. ELY, supra note 1, at 73.
16 Id. at 87.
17 Presumably these processes are law making and administration by elected officials, which would be "participatory" in an attenuated sense insofar as the system relies
on representation rather than direct democracy.
18 J. ELY, supra note 1, at 105.
19 Id. at 101 (quoting Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 254
(1975)).
20

Id. at 136.
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But the Constitution is not entirely indifferent to the end-results of
political processes. According to Ely, the Constitution calls for
"participation" in the benefits that result from governmental
21
functioning.
Ely's claim sounds odd; it can seem downright silly. For "participation" in benefits amounts to something like "enjoyment,"
whereas participation in decisionmaking means playing a part in the
processes. "Participation" in benefits therefore seems connected to
"participation" in decisionmaking processes only by a philosophical
pun.
But Ely does not mean this as a joke. He connects the two
modes of participation under ideas about representation that he attributes to the constitutional system, 2 2 which I think must be understood as follows. The first type of participation works primarily
through the electoral process-one of the processes which must always remain accessible. This process selects representatives who are
together charged with the task of setting governmental policies and
who collectively lie under a duty of representation. Ely holds that
government should treat those who are ruled with "equal concern
and respect." 23 This means, according to Ely, that government
must take fully into account everyone's interests. In this way, those
who are ruled are assured an appropriate measure of participation
in the benefits that emerge from the processes of representative
24
democracy.
Ely believes that this theory accounts for ideas underlying the
original Constitution, but especially for the amended Constitution
as it has come down to us. He believes that majority rule was originally expected to insure that government would serve the interests
of those governed. But this places too much faith in "pluralism."
We have learned that those who wield majoritarian power can systematically neglect the interests of others.
We have learned, therefore, that formal access to the political
process can be open, while genuine access to its "bounty" 25 is restricted. And so, for example, Ely concludes that, within the context
of our system and its history, "equal protection" should be understood as insuring access to the products of the process. This puts
Id. at 87.
See id. at 77-88. Ely applies these ideas to the government as a whole rather than
to individual representatives.
23 Id. at 82 (quoting R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrs SERIOUSLY 180 (1977)).
24
Ely claims to be following Dworkin here, but I think Dworkin would object that
21

22

Ely's failure to discount "external" preferences violates the requirement that all be
treated with equal concern and respect. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrs SERIOUSLY 23439 (1977).
25 J. ELY, supra note 1, at 74.
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the general theory to work clarifying unclear aspects of the
Constitution.
Ely accepts that "equal protection" does not confer on everyone rights to equal shares in the benefits of representative government. "Equal protection" means, rather, that we have rights to
genuine representation of our interests in the government's deliberations. The political process may not neglect one's interests when
distributing benefits.
III
SUBSTANCE, PROCESS, AND OUTCOME IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

I want now to comment on some aspects of Ely's theory. I intend to suggest how much more is required to develop a theory of
the Constitution.
Ely's use of the distinction between "process" and "substance"
has attracted much criticism. 26 Laurence Tribe argues, for example,
that "much of our constitutional history" turns on "substantive"
27
concerns about religious freedom, slavery, and private property.
In other words, Ely exaggerates how much the Constitution emphasizes "process."
This is an important point. Ely's approach assumes that unclear
aspects of the Constitution may be interpreted by making them
serve the constitutionally prescribed processes. But, insofar as the
Constitution is committed to "substantive" (that is, nonprocess) values, these values might equally provide a basis for its interpretation.
It would certainly seem to make a difference whether or not one
adopts Ely's approach to constitutional interpretation. Take, for example, the first amendment's statement that "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech." 2 8 Arguably, the words
"the freedom of speech" refer to a limited class of speech that is
immune to congressional interference. Ely's approach would support this line of reasoning, and it might lead us to a very narrow
conception of constitutionally protected speech. 2 9 It would limit
26 Some of this reflects a failure to read Ely carefully. See id. at 75 (terminological
note).
27 Tribe, supra note 2, at 1067.
28 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
29 Bork construes the constitutional protections for speech by interpreting the first
amendment in terms of what speech would be required to make the system of "Madisonian democracy" work (which he claims would be strictly "political" speech that advo-

cates nothing unlawful). Bork, supra note 3, at 17-35. Bork's argument appears, in
effect, to apply Black's strategy for deriving unspecified rights from an understanding of
the institutions that the Constitution prescribes. See generally C. BLAcK, supra note 10. By
ignoring the difference that having a first amendment makes, and restricting the scope
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speech to just that needed to make the political processes work
properly, and no more.
It is unclear just how much speech this would include. Perhaps
the institutions of representative democracy will not function as they
should unless protections for speech are very broad and strong. 30
In any case, if we believed that the Constitution is dedicated to the
service of some "substantive" values, we could not assume that the
Constitution limits protections for speech to what the political
processes need to work.
Some critics argue, then, that Ely exaggerates the Constitution's emphasis on "process." I mention this point in order to distinguish it from a different objection, which might be put as follows:
In order to interpret the Constitution, including the parts that emphasize "process," one must inevitably have recourse to "substantive" values. 3 1 This argument is independent of the claim that the
Constitution emphasizes some "substantive" values. Tribe's point
here is that courts seeking to clarify what processes the Constitution
prescribes will need guidance from the "substantive" values that
32
those processes are supposed to serve.
This point needs explanation and defense. Tribe seems simply
to assume that the processes prescribed by the Constitution have no
value of their own and must instead serve some independent, "sub33
stantive" values.
Our understanding of the issue is hindered by Ely's choice of
terms. His distinction between "process" and "substance" is illconceived: "process" should be contrasted, not with "substance,"
but with outcome. There is considerable evidence that this is, in fact,
what Ely has in mind. The following passage is worth repeating:
The constitutionality of most distributions .

.

. cannot be deter-

mined simply by looking to see who ended up with what, but
rather can be approached intelligibly only by attending to the process that brought about the distribution in question-by what
Robert Nozick has called a "historical" (as opposed to an "end34
result") approach.
of a specified right to that of a derived right, instead of adding the latter to the former,
Bork's interpretation of the first amendment turns Black's suggestion on its head.
30 Bork does not even consider this possibility. See Bork, supra note 3.
31
See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1069-72.
32
Id.
33
When making this point during the lecture I suggested in passing that the same
applies to Dworkin, but in reviewing the materials while preparing these notes I have
discovered that I was mistaken. Dworkin argues that a conception of democracy that is

capable of serving the needs of constitutional adjudication requires an "outcome," nonprocess-based, defense. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 500-16.
34 J. ELY, supra note I, at 136; see R. NOZICK, ANARCHY,
(1974).

STATE, AND UTOPIA

150-82
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The Constitution prescribes a certain kind of process, but it does
not prescribe how to distribute the products of the process. Ely's
point is that the Constitution emphasizes "process" as opposed to
outcome. So it might seem that he could meet the second objection
simply by refining his terminology.
But the basic issue is not terminological. The question is
whether to understand representative democracy on the model of
Nozick's "historical" conception of justice. Following Nozick, Ely
characterizes the political processes of representative democracy
that are prescribed by the Constitution as "legitimate." 3 5 He appears to mean, as he occasionally says, that the processes are supposed to be fair, and that thefairness of those processes makes the outcomes
36
fair or legitimate too-not the other way around.
Is that correct? What in the overall design of a representative
political system produces fairness? Is fairness process-based, or
outcome-based, or some combination of the two?
Let me clarify the alternatives. One might suppose (at least as a
first approximation) that a criminal procedure is fair because it reliably distinguishes the guilty from the innocent and identifies them
correctly. If so, then a process can be fair because it tends to produce a valued outcome that one can, in principle, identify independent of the process.
By contrast, a lottery's fairness is not a function of its outcome,
except in a negative way: in order to reach an impartial result it must
not be rigged. We cannot judge the fairness of a lottery's outcome
independently of the lottery itself. A fair lottery, then, exemplifies
'3 7
whatJohn Rawls labels "pure procedural justice.
The question that we face-a familiar question within political
theory-is whether representative government is desirable because
of its tendency to produce valued results (such as service of the interests of all those who are governed, which might conceivably be
done in some other way), or rather because of the values that inhere
in or that are served directly by the basic processes of representative
democracy (values that we might not be able to serve in any other
way). A satisfactory answer might, of course, involve some combination of the two possibilities.
By following Nozick, Ely suggests that one will find the virtues
35

J. ELY, supra note 1, at 101.

36

Id. at 102-03.

37

J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86 (1971). Procedures that presuppose in-

dependent criteria of justice for evaluating outcomes might exemplify either "perfect
procedural justice" (when they are guaranteed to achieve results that are independently
valued) or "imperfect procedural justice" (when they are reliable means to results that
are independently valued, but cannot guarantee such results).
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of representative democracy in its processes themselves. Nozick
holds that the justice of distributions depends entirely on the "legitimacy" of "transactions." 3 8 He means that the outcome's justice depends entirely on the character of the process. In drawing the
analogy with Nozick's "historical" conception of justice, therefore,
Ely suggests that representative democracy is valuable, not because
of its tendency to promote independent values, but simply because
of its inherent fairness. Thus, Ely appears to reject any instrumental
valuation of representative democracy, but he provides no reason
for his rejection.
A more general problem remains. Most constitutional scholars
seem to believe, in effect, that a theory concerning the character of
constitutional institutions must guide an interpretation of the Constitution itself. But these scholars usually limit their general theories to simple talk about "democracy" or "majoritarianism." They
fail to explain what that means, in part because they do not address
the question of what values a constitutional system like ours should
serve.
Ely's analysis of the idea that the Constitution stands for representative democracy is, by comparison, complex, but he stops the
analysis prematurely. He says, in effect, that we must understand
the Constitution in terms of the political principles that its institutional prescriptions presuppose. My present point is that the principles of representative democracy themselves require clarification,
and that the results will affect the way we understand unclear aspects of the Constitution.
Ely's strategy for interpreting the Constitution is to be guided
by the political principles for which it stands-the principles of representative democracy. This suggests a general approach to interpretation, that is, one that refers to more fundamental values. This
general approach implies that we should interpret the principles of
representative democracy, in turn, by reference to the more basic
values that they serve.
This would hold even if representative democracy were understood as an instance of pure procedural justice. The point is that
the reasons for regarding representative democracy as a good thing
are neither obvious nor uncontroversial. It is unclear whether the
processes of representative democracy are supposed to be inherently fair, so that whatever comes out of them is morally acceptable,
or whether they are useful means to some independent ends. We
need to understand what values representative democracy serves

38

R. NozicK, supra note 34, at 150-82.
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and how its processes serve them.3 9 Only then can we interpret unclear aspects of the Constitution so that those values will be served.
And only then can we determine the relation between judicial review and the principles of representative democracy.
Let me reinforce the suggestion that there is need for further
inquiry. Supposing that representative government, as such, is inherently fair and justifiable on the basis of its intrinsic merits is implausible for two reasons. First, as a species of democracy,
representative democracy seems but a "second-best," compromise
arrangement-more feasible than, but in principle inferior to, direct, participatory democracy. Second, one might limit simple
majoritarian democracy in order to protect or serve independent
values that simple majoritarianism threatens. It is often observed,
for example, that the Constitution appears to provide special protections for private property. To suppose that such provisions
might be justified is not to assume that they serve the values that
underlie representative democracy.
The system that we have inherited is neither unrestricted representative government nor simple democracy with restrictions. It is a
restricted form of representative government. To complicate matters, the Constitution has been amended in ways that appear to intensify its commitment to democracy. If we wish to interpret the
unclear aspects of the Constitution by reference to the theory of
government that underlies it, then we will have to figure out how
best to understand that theory. I have suggested that we understand the theory by reference to the values that such a form of government serves.
This will appear obvious to some and subversive to others. But
if it is legitimate to understand the Constitution by reference to
principles that are not specified by it-a proposition with which
everyone seems to agree, including the so-called "interpretivists" 4 0-then it is arbitrary and self-defeating to stop the inquiry
at the first level of analysis, as Ely and others do.
I can suggest one reason why the analysis stops. Along with
many other legal scholars, Ely is uncomfortable with the idea that
constitutional interpretation might depend upon judgments about
value. It is conventional wisdom that the Constitution stands for
something like "representative democracy." This idea is so uncontroversial, however, that it may not seem like interpretation at all
and, given the prevailing attitudes among legal theorists towards
"value judgments," the point is so conventionally acceptable that it
39 For some suggestions on the values of representative democracy, seeJ. PENNOCK,
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 3-15 (1979), and Dworkin, supra note 2.
40 See Lyons, supra note 4, at 89.
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may not seem to involve any kind of "value judgment." Furthermore, most of those who engage in constitutional theory do not
question the moral legitimacy of either representative democracy or
the American constitutional system. Thus, even normative constitutional theory develops without seeming to need any normative
premises. Furthermore, the legacy of moral skepticism within
American jurisprudence discourages one from venturing furtherfrom inquiring into the values that underlie representative democracy. The theoretical inquiry is thus inhibited. The result is an
abortive exercise in constitutional theory.
IV
FAIRNESS IN THE "POLITICAL MARKET"

I have just commented on the question whether one should
value representative democracy for itself or for its instrumental use.
I will now consider the problem of what properties the political
processes of representative democracy must have in order to be fair.
Ely appears to embrace two different models. I have mentioned
his suggestion that the government has a duty of representation
which requires that it keep access open to the benefits produced by
the political processes, as well as to the processes themselves. The
former condition appears satisfied, on Ely's view, so long as the government takes each person's interests fully into account. The following passage suggests his other model:
The approach to constitutional adjudication recommended
here is akin to what might be called an "antitrust" as opposed to a
"regulatory" orientation to economic affairs-rather than dictate
substantive results it intervenes only when the "market," in our
4
case the political market, is systemically malfunctioning. '
He continues, "A referee analogy is also not far off: the referee is to
intervene only when one team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the 'wrong' team has scored."' 4 2 This model reflects more
than the first the idea that representative democracy comprises certain processes. It also follows more closely Nozick's use of the market analogy in developing his "historical" conception ofjustice. But
this model generates important, difficult questions: for example,
what constitutes a systemic malfunction of the political "market"?
When do participants in the political "market" enjoy unfair advantage or suffer unfair disadvantage? Ely does not explicitly address
such questions.
Although Ely employs the market analogy, he does not pursue
41
42

J. ELY, supra note 1, at 102-03 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
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it far. Here, too, he follows Nozick's unfortunate example. Nozick's
theory of justice underestimates the difficulty of describing the essential features of a process whose outcomes are morally acceptable,
regardless of how benefits and burdens are distributed as a consequence. Nozick suggests, for example, that an economic transaction
is "legitimate" so long as the parties to it are not subject to force or
43
fraud.
That seems inadequate for at least two reasons. It ignores the
problem of "externalities"-the fact that private agreements can
have effects upon third parties that impermissibly violate their rights.
Furthermore, it adopts an overly simple conception of market fairness. Nozick's formula ignores, for instance, the relative positions
of the participants; economic exchanges cannot be considered fairso that all their results are morally acceptable-when one of the par44
ties controls the market and can dictate terms with impunity.
This last illustration suggests that the theory of representative
democracy should be concerned with the effects of power centers on
the fairness of the political process. Concentrations of political, as
well as economic, power tend to limit the fairness of the respective
"markets." Our British friends from "Beyond the Fringe" made a
relevant point when they compared political parties on the two sides
of the Atlantic: they observed that whereas our Republican Party
corresponds to their Conservative Party, our Democratic Party cor45
responds to their Conservative Party.
Does our two-party system limit options in a way that undermines the fairness of the political "market"? If constitutional theory
is to use the market metaphor, it must recognize the need to answer
such a question.
One possible defense of a two-party system is worth mentioning
now. One might argue that participants have plenty of choices, at
several levels, and that the electorate is not limited to choosing between Tweedledum and Tweedledee:
After all (we might be told), we are free to work for a wider and
more agreeable range of options-by forming new coalitions, for
example. If the two-party system is stable, that is because so many
are content with the range and quality of choices that it offers.
And if people do not take advantage of the political opportunities,
it is not because they are unable to do so. Rather, it is because43 R. NozIcK, supra note 34, at 150-82.
44 Such a market would not be competitive, but prohibiting force and fraud in
transactions does not guarantee competitiveness. In any case, a competitive and fair

market is difficult to define. In addition, the interaction between fairness and competitiveness is unclear and determining what differences in resources or other conditions
create unfairness in a market is difficult.
45

Beyond the Fringe (Capital Records, Inc. 1962).

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

758

[Vol. 72:745

for one reason or another (such as the assignment of a low priority to the issue)-they simply choose not to.
I shall not now pursue this particular question further. Instead I will
take up a parallel problem with which Ely deals-the question of
whether sex discrimination should be considered an equal protection issue.
In Ely's terms, the question is whether women's access is
blocked to the political processes or to the politically generated benefits. His answer is no. Although "access was blocked in the past,"
he says, it "can't responsibly be said to be so any longer."'46 He
sums up the point as follows:
[I]f women don't protect themselves from sex discrimination in
the future, it won't be because they can't. It will rather be because
for one reason or another-substantive disagreement or more
likely the assignment of a low priority to the issue-they don't
choose to. Many of us may condemn such a choice as benighted
47
on the merits, but that is not a constitutional argument.
Ely's treatment of this issue merits close scrutiny for a variety of
reasons. I will focus, however, only on ways in which the problem
reflects the need for further development of the theory of representative democracy.
A momentary return to the economic model may be helpful.
Our understanding and appraisal of "free" markets appear to assume that participants have appropriate attitudes. They seem to assume, for example, a willingness, perhaps an inclination, to
compete. Without such dispositions, those who must rely on markets to secure their shares of basic goods will do comparatively
badly.
It would be a mistake, I think, to claim that noncompetitive individuals use the market to pursue their interests just like everyone
else because one of the interests they serve is an aversion to competition. The problem is that, within a market context, competitive
attitudes are not simply interests equal to others, but are keys to the
benefits that one can obtain from the process.
Suppose, now, that some who must rely upon an economic market for their needs have been subjected, against their wills, to psychological conditioning which insures that they have an aversion to
competition, a lack of confidence in their abilities to compete, or
simply a tendency to defer to the perceived needs of others. Imagine, in other words, that some have been forced to become losers in
a competitive context. Such conditioning would block their access
46

J. ELY, supra note 1, at 169.
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Id. at 169-70.
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to the benefits of the process. Does that violate the requirements of
a fair market? I am inclined to think that it does.
We can apply this analysis to Ely's discussion of women. His
point is that if women do not protect themselves from sex discrimination, their inaction simply reflects the women's choice. It will not
reflect a fault in the political market. As with conditioned losers in
the economic market, however, one may argue that the fairness of the
political market presupposes that participants have comparable competitive dispositions. Although the analogy is not perfect, 48 it does
suggest that Ely's argument is unsound.
We have insufficient knowledge of the psychological and social
mechanisms to allow unqualified judgments here, but I suspect that
there are grounds for thinking that the socialization of women typically results in a competitive disadvantage in the political as well as
the economic market. If so, then the presuppositions of a fair political market are apparently unsatisfied.
I have just scratched the surface of this issue. But my point is
that one cannot appreciate the need for further inquiry unless one
addresses the question: What makes a political process fair?
V
THEORIES OF THE CONSTITUTION

I will conclude with some comments on a question that is at
once one of the more general, more difficult, and most neglected in
this area. It may be formulated as follows: What relation must a
theory have to the Constitution if it is to be a theory of the
Constitution?
As more than one type of theory is possible, I should try to clarify this question by referring to the function of such a theory. 4 9 I
have in mind a theory that is meant to guide interpretation of the
Constitution and, consequently, the disposition of constitutional
cases.
It is tempting to begin by distinguishing between theories that
attempt to explain and those that seek to justify. The problem with
such an approach, however, is that some of the same factors are
likely to play a role in both types of theory. For example, any plausi48 1 imagined in the original example that some persons were subjected against
their wills to conditioning of the sort that, in real life, women may typically be subjected
to from infancy. We would not perhaps think of infants and small children as being
subjected to conditioning "against their wills" when such attitudes and dispositions are
inculcated, but the parallels appear morally relevant.
49 One question I do not consider is what "the Constitution" encompasses, that is,
whether it includes authoritative and standard judicial interpretations of the Constitution, regardless of their soundness.
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ble explanation of how the Constitution evolved will very likely refer
to the influence of certain political convictions, and theories that
provide plausible justifications for the adoption or maintenance of
the same Constitution will likely assume the soundness of these
convictions.
Consider, for example, the principle that legislators and administrators should be "accountable" to a broad, popular electorate.
One may plausibly suppose that part of the explanation for having a
Constitution seemingly committed to that principle is the conviction
of those who helped shape the Constitution that the entrenchment
of such a principle is necessary if the Constitution is to be justifiable.
Thus, the principle is likely to play a role in theories that explain
how we came to have this Constitution. Similarly, insofar as the relevant convictions are sound, the principle of electoral accountability
of officials will help to justify a Constitution that respects it. I suspect that this overlap of explanatory and normative theories encourages the tendency to consider "original intent" when theorizing
about the Constitution and to assume that such factors have a
proper place in normative theories ofjudicial review. 50 In any case,
any theory meant to guide interpretation of the Constitution seems
to seek justifiable decisions.
One approach to theorizing about the Constitution begins platitudinously by asserting that the Constitution must be taken as a
"given," 5 1 but goes on to assume that interpretation must be purely
historical and linguistic and, most importantly, purely value-free.
One might typically defend this approach in part as follows:
When judges are called upon to interpret the Constitution, their
job is to figure out what, in fact, it means. They must consider the
actual text, the original intentions that informed that text, and
subsequent history. The task of interpretation is often formidable, but the difficulties do not license judges to undertake a different inquiry entirely-to base interpretations on a different
constitution, one that they would prefer us to have. Their job is
to apply that Constitution which, for better or worse, we actually
do have.
This argument assumes, of course, that constitutional interpretation
can be purely linguistic and historical, purely value-free.
Conversely, some contend that value-free interpretation isimpossible. One commonplace but irrelevant argument to this effect is
the claim that we cannot avoid being influenced by our values when
we make difficult judgments that have politically significant consequences, as often happens in constitutional interpretation. That is a
50
51

For a criticism of this assumption, see Lyons, supra note 4, at 75-82.
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 3, at 3.
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psychological claim. It does not show that value-laden interpretation is preferable, and it ignores the corrective mechanisms within a
social process like constitutional interpretation.
A different argument contends that supposedly value-free linguistic and historical methods of interpretation unavoidably generate alternative interpretations, and that only an appeal to political
principles will provide a justified choice between these competing
interpretations.
Ronald Dworkin has persuasively argued, for example, that reference to "original intent" is inherently ambiguous, 5 2 and that only
an appeal to principles of political morality can eliminate such ambiguity. 53 But the second point needs to be shown; the former point
does not entail the latter. It is plausible to suppose that political
principles have an essential role to play in this context, but I have
seen no argument establishing that political principles alone can
provide a rational basis for selecting between alternative interpretations of a constitutional document.
Paul Brest once suggested a reason for having recourse to political principles: he suggested that an overriding mission of constitu54
tional theory is to establish the "authority" of the Constitution.
But he did not explain what kind of authority he had in mind, or why
constitutional theory should try to secure it. And he seems, paradoxically, to have invoked the need to establish the authority of the
Constitution as a reason, not for interpreting the Constitution, but
for invoking values that he thought could not be attributed to the
Constitution. Brest's suggestion goes off course.
But we can, I think, reconstruct what Brest and others might
have had in mind. The following may simply express what is often
assumed. I have yet to see the argument developed, though it is
obviously needed.
Constitutional adjudication regulates activities within our political system. Like legal decisions generally, constitutional decisions
require justification, and, insofar as constitutional interpretation
makes a difference to decisions, it requires justification too.
By "justification" I mean the following. Many of the normal,
routine activities of law, as well as its enforcement mechanisms, involve practices that clearly require justification. People who act in
the name of the law do things which would require justification if
they were not done in the name of the law-they use coercion and
force, they kill and maim, they deprive people of liberty and valued
goods. The mere fact that something is done in the name of the law
52

53
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See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 2, at 471-500.
Id.
Brest, supra note 7, at 224-38.
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does not automatically confer on that activity any measure ofjustification. The conclusion I draw is that judicial decisions, like other
things, stand in need of full-fledged moral justification. 55
This suggests-although it does not yet entail-that interpretation of law generally, and of the Constitution in particular, should
not be value-free, but should be conducted so as to promote the fullfledged moral justification of the decisions that turn upon such interpretations. This can be done if-and I suspect only if-one
selects between competing interpretations so as to render the resulting decisions justifiable, as far as that is possible.
Such choices will be a complex matter, because acts done in the
name of the law, like acts within complex institutions generally, can
be justified in a variety of ways-on their own merits or on the merits of the law or of the system of law that requires them (or some
combination thereof). So the interpretation of a specific decision
presupposes a normative conception of the laws under which the
decision is made.
If we call those conceptions "theories," then we have at least
the sketch (although as yet no more than a sketch) of an argument to
the effect that a theory of the Constitution should be related to the
Constitution in a certain way, that is, so as to render the Constitution justifiable.
I believe this idea accords with a good deal of the practice of
legal and specifically constitutional interpretation. I also believe it is
consistent with the idea that constitutional theory should regard the
Constitution as a "given." This approach assumes in part a stringent judicial obligation of fidelity to the law, and specifically to the
Constitution. It also assumes, somewhat independently, the justifiability of the Constitution and the political system that grew up under
it, all things considered.
It is important to emphasize that the assumption ofjustifiability
is not trivial. For at least half of the life of the Constitution (perhaps
much longer), there have been obvious grounds for skepticism
about its justifiability, even though most of those engaged in its administration may have had no more doubts about it than their coun56
terparts do now.
That leads me to express a qualm about the idea I have been
55 See Lyons, supra note 4; Lyons, Derivability, Defensibility, and theJustification ofJudicial Decisions, 68 MONIST 325 (1985). A similar point is suggested in R. DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 93-108 (1986), which I discuss in ReconstructingLegal Theory, forthcoming in PHIL.
& PUB. AFF.

56 Conventional w;sdom only allows doubts about the justifiability of the Constitution in the past tense. This accompanies the complacent thinking that characterizes a
system as "representative democracy" even though it disenfranchises the vast majority
of adults.
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suggesting, namely, that interpretational theories should construe
the Constitution so that it is justifiable, if that is possible.
Interpretation of the law proceeds within a variety of contexts.
Some interpretations are rendered by people who are empowered
to provide authoritative readings and applications of the law. Thus
far I have developed my argument with their activities in mind. But
interpretations are rendered for other reasons too-the most important for present purposes being the appraisal of the law.
I see no reason, either in logic or experience, for someone who
is critically evaluating the law to give it the benefit of the doubt. It is
incumbent on the critic to judge the law for what it is. Failure to do
so constitutes not merely an intellectual but also, I think, a moral
fault. It is, for example, a failure to take the side of those who suffer
injustice or at least to acknowledge the injustice, and experience indicates that such failures occur for reasons we do not like to admit.
This suggests that interpretations rendered by critics who are
doing their jobs well may diverge from interpretations rendered by
judges who are doing theirjobs well. What I have said so far implies,
I think, that judges who do their jobs well interpret the law so that it
literally becomes better than it otherwise would be. But those
judges may not dominate the system. If they do not, then the law
may unfortunately evolve in the direction of unsound interpretations. So an honest critic could not always base an accurate picture
of the law on the practice of its best interpreters, especially if she
had sufficient reason to expect contrary interpretations to dominate
adjudication.
Another problem is that this approach to legal and specifically
constitutional interpretation is motivated by moral, not purely intellectual, considerations. I have not suggested that morality requires
misinterpretation of the law. But neither do I believe it has been
shown, or that we can assume, that the approach to interpretation I
have advocated yields interpretations that are truer to the Constitu57
tion than the alternatives. The question remains open.
57 These concluding reflections proved provocative, and they elicited some vigorous questions after the lecture-questions I cannot adequately answer here, if I can answer them at all. For now it may be helpful if I amplify the concluding point. Dworkin
argues that sound legal interpretation, like interpretation in general, shows law in the
best light possible. R. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 45-68. I am unpersuaded. See Lyons,
ReconstructingLegal Theory, supra note 55. In the lecture I suggested that we should welcome interpretations that put the law in a morally good light. Decisions based on such
interpretations might be morally desirable, but it does not follow that such interpretations are legally sound, or sounder than possible alternatives. (It is worth emphasizing
that the best theory of interpretation-whatever it may turn out to be-need not provide
a determinate interpretation of the law in all cases, especially when there are good moral
reasons for welcoming a particular interpretation. This is not invalidly to infer indeterminacy from unclarity, but only to recognize that certain kinds of indeterminacy are
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possible.) One may object that I have not identified any plausible alternative to the
theory of interpretation that would read the law in the best light possible. I concede the
point, but suggest that inferring from that the soundness of Dworkin's approach to interpretation is premature. I am by no means skeptical about the possibility of there
being a best (or soundest) theory of legal interpretation, but I am not persuaded that I
have already seen that theory.

